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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The unfortunate plaintiff in the principal case is without a statutory
remedy and probably without a common-law remedy. However, the
case can serve a much greater purpose than food for torts' thought.
Despite whatever logic there may have been in including the sale of
lead compounds used in paint under the "Pharmacy" caption of the North
Carolina General Statutes, section 90-77 is now in an anomalous posi-
tion. It would seem to be as much in the public interest and safety
to have legislation regulating the sale of lead compounds used as paint
ingredients as it is now for public safety that we have legislation regu-
lating the sale of insecticides, fungicides, and rodenticides.2 4 The only
existing regulatory legislation in the general area of paint products ap-
plies to the sale of linseed oil2 and turpentine.2 6  In view of the in-
herently dangerous quality of lead compounds used as paint ingredients,
the slight cost to the manufacturer in placing appropriate labels on con-
tainers,2 7 and the welfare of the public, it is submitted that the duty to
warn should be made statutory.
WILLIAM H. MCCULLOUGH
Wills-Devises and Bequests by Implication
In Finch v. Honeycutt' the testator declared in his will: "My estate
is a community estate2 with my wife Georgia Greer Honeycutt and has
been held as such for several years when paying Federal and State In-
come Tax.
"Therefore it is my will that my half of my and her (wife) estate be
given to my three children." 3  No further mention of the other half of
the estate was made anywhere in the will. Held, a half interest of all
the real and personal property of the deceased went to the wife in fee
under the will by virtue of the doctrine of devises and bequests by im-
plication.
In an earlier North Carolina case, Burcham v. Burcham,4 the testator
willed his wife "support" and expressed his desire that she should have
-'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.1 (1952). This is the insecticide, fungicide and
rodenticide act.
21 N.C. GELS. STAT. § 106-285 (1952).
- N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-303 (1952).
"The insecticide, fungicide, and rodenticide act requires the labeling of the
enumerated poisons with a skull and crossbones symbol and a "poison" label in red
letters against a differently colored background. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.3
(3) (1952). This would seem to be an appropriate label to place on containers of
lead compounds used as paint ingredients.
'246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957).
'The doctrine of community property is given effect in only seven states:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas. 41
C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 462(c) (Supp. 1957).
8 246 N.C. at 92, 97 S.E.2d at 480.
'219 N.C. 357, 13 S.E.2d 615 (1941).
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anything she wanted, and could live anywhere she wanted to, and have
a good time for the remainder of her life so long as she did not marry
again. The court found from these expressions of the testator that
his intent was that the entire property be used for his wife's benefit
during her lifetime or widowhood and found the inference so strong as
to necessarily give the widow a power of disposition.5
In another case, Efird v. Efird,6 the testator stated in his will that the
homeplace where he and his wife lived was owned by them as tenants
by the entirety, and that "upon my death . . . she will automatically
own" it. In fact, the testator owned the property individually. In later
sections of the will the testator made provisions to be carried out "after
the above properties shall have been given to my wife." (Emphasis
added.) The court said this language referred back to the testator's
previous statement that the wife would automatically own the home-
place at his death, and held that the will manifested an intent that the
homeplace should go to the wife.
In the principal case the testator made no reference to any part
of the estate that might be given or allotted to his wife. There were
no words sufficient to tie the testator's statement that his wife owned an
interest in the estate into an expression of intent that any interest should
pass to her under the will, as was found in the Efird case. If he were
under the impression that his wife owned half the estate in her own
right, then it appears illogical that he intended such half to pass to her
under his will.
A search of the authorities has revealed only a few holdings from
other jurisdictions on this issue. In In re Boehn's Will' the will
stated: "There are other pieces of real estate in my name only ....
However, the ownership of them represents the joint efforts of my
husband and myself in work, savings, improvement, care, and manage-
ment. It would be fair, I believe to consider and say that his interest
is half and mine half, and I so declare." The New York court held
that such declaration did not constitute a devise to the husband., The
court said that it would be absurd to find that the testatrix intended
to dispose of property which she declared she did not own.
In Hatch v. Ferguson0 the testator made a devise to his children of
5 The testator also made certain provisions for disposal of the property after
the wife's death.8 234 N.C. 607, 68 S.E.2d 279 (1951).
198 Misc. 994, 101 N.Y.S2d 812 (Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 1069,
121 N.Y.S.2d 766 (4th Dep't 1953).
8 101 N.Y.S.2d at 813-14.
9 See Williams v. Allen, 17 Ga. 81 (1855), where the court stated that recitals
by the-testator in his will that erroneously declared title to property to be in a
third person, which, in fact, belonged to the testator, did not amount to a devise or
bequest of such property by the will.1* 68 Fed. 43 (9th Cir. 1895).
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all his estate, describing it as "being the one-half interest in the com-
munity property now owned by me and my said wife." It was found
that the testator owned the property individually, and the court held
that his descriptive language could only be regarded as the expression
of his opinion and did not convert the property into commnunity prop-
erty or operate as a devise of half thereof to his wife. The children
took all."
By the holding in the principal case it is apparent that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of devises and be-
quests by implication further than it had yet done. The result it reaches
is in conflict with the holdings of the jurisdictions discussed above. Yet
it seems that the result may well be the more desirable one, since it more
probably accords with the testator's intent as to whom the property
should go.
PAUL McMuRRAY
Workmen's Compensation-Injuries Sustained by Employee
While Going to and from Work
In Hardy v. Swall deceased, a thirteen year old boy, lived with
his family on the farm of. defendant under an arrangement whereby the
family paid no rent, but was allowed to occupy a house owned by de-
fendant in return for farm labor supplied by the family. Deceased lived
on the east side of a public highway which ran through defendant's farm,
and he had the duty of feeding defendant's livestock at a barn located
350 to 400 feet from his home on the west side of the highway. De-
ceased was required to feed the livestock twice a day and was paid
$1.50 per week for this service. On November 30, 1955, deceased had
crossed the highway, gone to the barn, fed the livestock, and was return-
ing to his home when he was struck by an automobile on the highway
and killed. Compensation proceedings were instituted.2 The Industrial
Commission found that the death was by accident rising out of and in
1 See Circuitt v. Perry, 23 Beav. 275, 53 Eng. Rep. 108 (Rolls 1856). Where
X willed all his real and personal property to Y but stated that on his death,
part of his father's property would, under his father's will, devolve upon his
nephews, when in fact the property then belonged to X, held, the property
of the father's estate did not pass to the nephews under X's will.
1246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (b) (1950) expressly excepts farm labor from the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but provides that if any employer
of farm labor has -purchased workmen's compensation insurance or insurance to
cover his compensation liability the employer shall be conclusively presumed, during
the life of the policy, to have accepted the provisions of the act. Defendant in
this case had such a policy which was active at the time of the death of the
decedent.
1958]
